In this paper, we describe a new cryptographic primitive called (One-Way) Signature Chaining. Signature chaining is essentially a method of generating a chain of signatures on the same message by different users. Each signature acts as a "link" of the chain. The one-way-ness implies that the chaining process is one-way in the sense that more links can be easily added to the chain. However, it is computationally infeasible to remove any intermediate links without removing all the links. The signatures so created are called chain signatures (CS). We give precise definitions of chain signatures and discuss some applications in trust transfer. We then present a practical construction of a CS scheme that is secure (in the random oracle model) under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in bilinear maps.
Introduction
Over recent years, a lot of research in e-commerce systems has been on the problem of trust transfer. Roughly speaking, trust transfer is the act of transferring the trust placed on the original user (the trusted ) to a proxy user (the trustee) such that some other user (the truster ) can delegate the same responsibilities to the trustee that he would have delegated to the trusted in some trust context (for instance, a electronic transaction).
In this paper, we attempt to give a formal treatment of this trust transfer using the notion of Chain signatures (CS). Chain signatures are similar to proxy signatures, where the original signer delegates signing power to a proxy signer [1] . In addition, chain signatures ensure that the hierarchy of the delegation is preserved and cannot be tampered with. The crucial difference is that chain signatures are completely non-interactive and stateless -the signer can be completely oblivious of the receiver's identity. The intriguing part of chain signatures is that despite this anonymity, they provide sufficient guarantee of the path from which this delegation was actually propagated. As an application of CS, consider wireless and ad-hoc sensor networks, where routing information often needs to be transmitted without prior knowledge of the topology.
Although the notion of chaining as described here has been informally discussed in several papers [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] , a proper security model and precise definitions are still lacking. In this paper, we fill this gap. Unlike the schemes of [2] or [3] , which require senders to authenticate the next-level path, our protocol puts this responsibility on the receivers.
In many ways, CS are similar to transitive signatures [8] in that they allow trust to be transferred between multiple entities. The difference is that transitive signatures attempt to hide the intermediate nodes of trust transfer, while CS try to ensure that intermediate nodes cannot be removed. Intuitively, chain signatures can be considered as a combination of Verifiably Encrypted Signatures (VES) [9, 10] and sequential aggregate signatures [11, 12] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We give the motivation for chain signatures in Section 2. We then formalize the intuition of chain signatures in Section 3.2. Finally, in Section 4 we present the scheme and prove its security in Section 4.3. We then discuss some applications of chain signatures in Section 5.
Motivation
To see the motivation behind chain signatures consider a scenario with three users Alice, Bob and Carol. Alice signs some message m and sends the signature σ A to Bob, after which she is not available for interaction. Now Bob wants to convince Carol that Alice indeed signed the message m. However if Carol later wants to convince a third party (using Bob's proof) the statement "Alice signed the message m" then she must only be able to do so by proving that "Bob knows about it too".
Intuition Behind Chain Signatures
Assume that users A, B compute signatures σ A , σ B (on the same message) using private keys SK A , SK B respectively. Define the following properties:
1. Aggregation: Given signatures σ A , σ B it is easy to compute a combined signature σ {A,B} that can be verified using public keys PK A , PK B .
2. Delete Protection: Given {σ {A,B} , PK A , PK B }, it must be infeasible to compute σ A or σ B
Strong Delete Protection:
This is a stronger variant of the previous property.
• Given {σ {A,B} , PK A , PK B , SK A }, it must be infeasible to compute σ B .
• Given {σ {A,B} , PK A , PK B , SK B }, it must be infeasible to compute σ A .
A signature scheme that satisfies the aggregation and delete protection conditions is called a Chain Signature (CS) scheme. A CS scheme that additionally satisfies the strong delete protection condition is called a Strong Chain Signature (SCS) scheme. The above idea can be extended to an arbitrary number of users. It is fairly trivial to extend the previous argument to arbitrary number of distinct users. Assume that users 1, 2, . . . n compute signatures σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . σ n (on the same message) using private keys SK 1 , SK 2 , . . . ,SK n respectively. We can then similarly define:
1. Aggregation: Given signatures σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . σ n , it is easy to compute a combined signature σ {1,2,...,n} that can be verified using public keys PK 1 ,PK 2 , . . . ,PK n .
2. Delete Protection: Given {σ {1,2,...,n} ,PK 1 ,PK 2 , . . .PK n }, it must be infeasible to compute σ α for any α {1, 2 . . . n} 3. Strong Delete Protection: Given {σ {1,2,...,n} ,PK 1 ,PK 2 , . . . ,PK n ,SK β1 ,SK β2 , . . . ,SK βi } for i < n and {β 1 , β 2 , . . . β i } {1, 2, . . .}, it must be infeasible to compute σ α for α = {1, 2, . . .
Although in the above (informal) description we assumed that the combined signature is "unordered", in our formal definition we will also take into account the order in which the users contribute. Our model of CS will not provide "strong delete protection". However, it will provide "delete protection".
Physical Analogue Of Chain Signatures
Chain signatures can be intuitively visualized by considering a box with a link and a set of "intermediate" links with an asymmetric combination lock, as shown in Figure 1 . In an asymmetric combination lock, the opening combination is different from the closing combination and cannot be derived from it. The initiator sends the box along with several open links and their closing combination(s) (but not the tags). The opening combination(s) are kept secret. Each user may then add a private tag to the "message", which is the equivalent of authentication. A signature is considered valid if there are no "loops" in the chain, each link has a tag, and all the tags are unique. 
Formal Definition -Chain Signatures
In this section, we will formalize the above intuition of chain signatures. Since chain signatures inherently deal with ordered elements (i.e. the public keys), we first develop some notation to deal with ordered elements, which we call sequences.
1.
A sequence is similar to a set except that the order of its elements matters. We require that the elements of a sequence must be distinct. The elements of a sequence are written in order and enclosed with , symbols. For instance, y 1 , y 2 , y 3 .
2. The symbol θ denotes the empty sequence with zero elements. The symbol denotes the empty string of zero length.
3. Let L a = y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k be some non-empty sequence. For any other sequence L b , we say that
Algorithms
A chain signature scheme is defined using three PPT algorithms KeyGen, ChainSign, ChainVerify as follows.
(It is more convenient to describe ChainVerify before ChainSign.)
KeyGen (Key Generation) This randomized algorithm takes as input a security parameter τ and outputs a randomly selected key-pair (x, y) such that x is the private key and y is the public key. We say that (x i , y i ) R ← KeyGen on the i th run of this algorithm.
ChainVerify (Verification) This algorithm takes as input a tuple (m, σ i , L i ). Here L i = y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y i is some sequence of i public keys and the pair (σ i , L i ) is a purported chain signature on message m. The algorithm works as follows:
1. If L i = θ and σ i = the algorithm outputs VALID and terminates.
2. If L i = θ and σ i = the algorithm outputs INVALID and terminates.
3. If this step is executed then L i = θ. The algorithm invokes a deterministic poly-time procedure after which it outputs either VALID or INVALID and terminates.
ChainSign (Signing) The ChainSign algorithm takes as input a tuple (
is a valid private-public key-pair (generated using the KeyGen algorithm), the pair (σ j , L j ) is a purported chain signature on message m, and L j = y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y j is some sequence of j public keys such that y i / ∈ {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y j }. The algorithm works as follows:
1. If any of the input conditions (as described above) are violated, the algorithm outputs ERROR and terminates.
2. The algorithm invokes ChainVerify with (m, σ j , L j ) as input (i.e. it checks whether (σ j , L j ) is a valid chain signature on m or not). If (σ j , L j ) is not a valid chain signature on message m, the algorithm outputs ERROR and terminates.
3. If this step is executed then no input conditions are violated and (σ j , L j ) is a valid chain signature on m. In this case this algorithm uses the private key
and terminates.
The ChainVerify and ChainSign algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint of signatures. That is, if the input (m, σ i , L i ) to the ChainVerify is the output of the ChainSign algorithm then the ChainVerify algorithm must output VALID. Note that ChainSign can be initialized by setting σ j = and L j = θ.
Security Model
We define adaptive security of chain signatures using Game 1 below. For simplicity, we assume that the adversary is not allowed to use a chosen private key. The adversary is, however, allowed to extract private keys of choice. In this respect, our model is similar to an identity based system. We call this adaptive security under known key and chosen message attack.
The reader should note that this is a weaker model than adaptive security under chosen key and chosen message attack used in the aggregate signatures of [9] . We feel, however, that our notation is more suitable in modeling the requirements of chain signatures (which are slightly different from aggregate signatures).
Game 1
1. Setup: The challenger C sets a parameter τ and gives it to the adversary A, who then selects a game parameter n. On receiving n, C generates n key-pairs (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), . . . (x n , y n ) R ← KeyGen and gives the set Y = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . y n } of n public keys to A. Denote by L the set of all non-empty sequences with elements from Y .
2.
Queries: Working adaptively, the adversary A issues at most q s chain sign queries and q e (privatekey) extract queries as follows:
The challenger responds with a valid chain signature (σ s(i) , L s(i) ) on m s(i) computed using the ChainSign algorithm. iii. At least one private key corresponding to L A has not been extracted.
We use the random oracle model [13] , where a hash function is implemented using a random oracle. If the adversary needs to compute a hash value it queries the random oracle, which is also simulated by the challenger. The requirement of a fair game is that the responses of the challenger (to hash queries) are indistinguishable from the responses of a random oracle.
Definition 3.1. We say that the chain signature scheme is (n, τ, t, q s , q e , q h , )-secure under an adaptive known-key and chosen-message attack if, for some parameters τ and n, there is no adversary A that runs for at most time t; makes at most q s sign queries; makes at most q e extract queries; makes at most q h hash queries; and wins Game 1 with probability at least . Otherwise, we say that A (n, τ, t, q s , q e , q h , )-breaks the chain signature scheme under an adaptive known-key and chosen-message attack.
Although full adaptive security of chain signatures under known key attacks and chosen message attacks is given by Definition 3.1, we will prove the security of our construction in a restricted model, which we called weak adaptive known key and chosen message attacks. In this model, the attacker A submits the extract queries before the challenge public keys are generated (for instance by specifying their index numbers). This is a reasonable assumption considering that even though the adversary is not allowed to actively corrupt participants, it is given unlimited access prior to the execution of the session. We define this using a modified version of Game 1, which we call Game 1-a.
Game 1-a: This is a variation of Game 1 with the following differences: (1) In the setup phase, the adversary submits not only the parameter n but also an n bit string extr, where the 1's of extr denote the indexes of the keys that the adversary wants to extract. (2) In the challenge phase, the challenger responds, not only with the public keys Y , but also the extracted private keys X corresponding to the non-zero bits of extr. (3) There are no private key extract queries in Game 1-a. Definition 3.2. We say that the chain signature scheme is (n, τ, t, q s , q e , q h , )-secure under a weak adaptive known-key and chosen-message attack if, for some parameters τ and n, there is no adversary A that runs for at most time t; makes at most q s sign queries; makes at most q e extract queries; makes at most q h hash queries; and wins Game 1-a with probability at least . Otherwise, we say that A (n, τ, t, q s , q e , q h , )-breaks the chain signature scheme under an adaptive known-key and chosenmessage attack. Game 1-a is similar to Game 1, except that the adversary must submit the (indexes of the) private key extract queries before the challenge phase is completed.
Analysis Of Game 1
Let us analyze the Result Section of Game 1. Clearly, Part (a) rules out the cases of a trivial win. The intuition of CS is captured in Part (b). To see this, consider the illustration of the ChainSign algorithm at some stage j.
Since we know that ChainSign can be "reversed" from σ j (using the private key x j ) to obtain σ j−1 , we can also consider the following figure as a valid usage of this algorithm.
Therefore, if L A and L s(i) overlap for some i and m A = m s(i) (we call such queries non-trivial queries), then we know that ChainSign can be "reversed" from σ s (i) and then "forwarded" to obtain σ A using only a subset of private keys for L A .
The security requirement of CS is that this is the only other way to generate σ A without knowing all the private keys of L A . The condition of Part (b) of the Result Section implies that if the adversary does not know at least one private key needed for this "reverse-forward" operation, then this is a valid win for the adversary.
Differences With Other Signature Schemes
In this section, we briefly demonstrate how chain signatures are different from other multi-user signature schemes such as sequential aggregate signatures [11, 12] , multisignatures [14] , aggregate signatures [9] , and structured multisignatures [7] . We distinguish between two types of forgers for chain signatures.
Type 1 Forger
This adversary either does not make any non-trivial queries or, if it makes one or more non-trivial queries then for each non-trivial query j, we have that L A ≺ L s(j) . We call such a forgery an Ordinary Forgery.
Type 2 Forger This adversary makes one or more non-trivial queries j such that L A ≺ L s(j) . We call such a forgery an Extraction Forgery.
All the above mentioned signature schemes only consider type 1 forgers, while chain signatures also consider type 2. To see this, consider the following instance of Game 1 with n = 7 and Y = {y i |1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The adversary outputs a valid chain-signature-message tuple (σ A , (m A , L A )) after making five extract queries on the keys {y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 5 , y 6 } and three non-trivial sign queries
The sequences are (keys of extract queries have a gray box):
Since for all the sequences L s(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ 3), at least one private key needed for the reverse-forward operation (described earlier) has not been extracted, the above configuration represents a win for the adversary of Game 1. The same configuration, however, represents a loss for the adversary of a suitably adapted game (adaptive chosen-key and chosen-message attack) in all the above mentioned schemes ( [11, 14, 9, 7] ) when we keep y 4 as the challenge public key.
Chain Signatures Using Bilinear Maps
In this section we give a concrete example of chain signatures using bilinear maps. First we describe the underlying primitives.
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups both of prime order q such that computing discrete logarithms in G 1 and G 2 is intractable. A bilinear pairing is a mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 that satisfies the following properties [15, 16, 9] . ) is a generator of G 2 .
Computability:
The mapê is efficiently computable.
The above properties also imply:
In a practical implementation, G 1 is a subgroup of the (additive 1 ) group of points on the elliptic curve and G 2 is the multiplicative subgroup of a finite field. The mapê is derived either from the modified Weil pairing [15, 16] or the Tate pairing [17] . Typically q ≥ 2 171 so that the fastest algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in G 1 (Pollard's rho method [18, 
BDH Parameter Generator
Using the idea of [15] , we define a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) parameter generator BDH as a randomized algorithm that takes as input τ ∈ N and outputs (ê, q, G 1 , G 2 ), where G 1 , G 2 are the descriptions of two cyclic multiplicative groups, each of prime order q such that q ≈ 2 τ , andê :
The security of chain signatures depends on the hardness of the following problem.
The Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDHA) states that the CDH (g,G1) problem is intractable for any PPT adversary. This is formally stated below.
CDHA. Let A be an algorithm, and ν : N → [0, 1] a function. We associate with any τ ∈ N the following experiment.
A (τ ) = 1 denote the advantage of A on input τ , the probability computed over the random choices of the inputs to A and the coins of A if any. We say that A has success bound ν for τ if Adv cdh A (τ ) ≤ ν(τ ) Assumption CDHA: For all poly-time algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν and an integer τ ∈ N, such that for all τ > τ , A has success bound ν. 
Chain Signature Protocol
In this scenario, n ordered distinct users 1, 2, . . . n , m ∈ Σ * is the message or contract.
System Parameters A Trusted Authority (TA) sets the parameter τ and generates (ê,
The chain signature of user i on m is (σ i , L i ).
ChainVerify We accept the signature (σ i , L i ) on m as valid if the following equality holds:
The correctness of the verification process follows from the property of bilinear maps:
Security Of The Construction
We will reuse the proof of security of the signature scheme of Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [15] (hereafter called BLS). The scheme is defined as follows.
Preliminary Setup For BLS Signatures A Trusted Authority (TA) sets a security parameter τ and generates (ê, G 1 , G 2 , q) R ←BDH(τ ). Here, G 1 , G 2 are descriptions of two groups each of prime order q ≈ τ bits andê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear mapping as defined above. The TA selects a one-way hash function H : Σ * → G 1 and picks a random generator g of G 1 . The system parameters are e, q, G 1 , G 2 , H, g .
1.
KeyGen Generate x R ← Z * q as the private key. The public key is y = g x ∈ G 1 .
2.
Sign To sign message m under public key y, compute h = H(m) and σ = h x ∈ G 1 . The algorithm outputs σ as a valid signature on message m under public key y.
3. Verify Accept the signature σ under the public key y as valid if the following holds:
Security of BLS signatures is defined using Game 2.
Game 2
1. Setup: The challenger sets some security parameter τ and generates a key pair (x, y) R ←KeyGen. It gives y, the challenge public key, along with τ to the adversary. Definition 4.2. We say that the BLS scheme is (τ , t , q s , q h )-secure against existential forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack if for some parameter τ , there is no adversary A that runs for at most time t ; makes at most q s sign queries and q h hash queries; and wins Game 2 with probability at least . Otherwise, if such an adversary A exists, then we say that A (τ , t , q s , q h , )-breaks the BLS scheme.
To prove the security of chain signatures, we will use the following result from [15] . 
Here, c G1 is a constant that depends on G 1 and e is the base of natural logarithms.
Our security follows from Theorem 4.4 below.
Theorem 4.4. Let there exist an algorithm
A that (n, τ, t, q s , q e , q h , e)-breaks the chain signature scheme under Definition 3.2. Then there exists another algorithm B that (τ , t , q s , q h , e )-breaks the BLS scheme under Definition 4.2, where;
Proof. Let there exist an adversary A that (n, τ, t, q s , q e , q h , e)-breaks the chain signature scheme under a weak adaptive known key and chosen message attack. Using A, we construct another algorithm B that (τ , t , q s , q h , e )-breaks the BLS signature scheme under an adaptive chosen message attack. Algorithm B simulates the adversary of Game 2 and is given a challenge public key (g, y) = (g, g x ) ∈ G 1 2 (for unknown x), along with a security parameter τ by challenger C. Its goal is to forge a valid BLS signature under y using adversary A, that can win Game 1-a.
Denote the BLS hash and sign oracles by H BLS and Sign BLS respectively and denote the chain signature hash oracle by H. The oracles H BLS and Sign BLS will be simulated by C, while H will be simulated by B.
Setup. Algorithm B simulates the challenger of Game 1-a to adversary A. It gives the parameter τ = τ to A, who returns an n bit value extr, indicating by 1 the private keys it wants to extract.
Denote the i th bit of extr by bit i . Algorithm B maintains a table of n entries called the K-List. Each entry i in the table is a tuple of the form (a i , r i , y i ) ∈ {0, 1} × Z * q × G 1 and is created as follows. B generates r i R ← Z q and a bit a i R ← {0, 1} using a biased coin such that Pr[a i = 0] = 1/q s . It then computes y i = y ai(1−biti) g ri ∈ G 1 and adds the entry (a i , r i , y i ) to the K-List. B gives the set Y = {y i |1 ≤ i ≤ n} as the challenge public keys, along with the set X = {r i · bit i |1 ≤ i ≤ n} as the extracted private keys to A.
Queries. To handle the queries of A, algorithm B works as follows.
Hash: At any time A may query the random oracle H. To respond to hash queries, B maintains another table called the H-List (which is initially empty and can have up to n(q h + q s ) entries). Each entry i in the list is of the form,
, and can be interpreted using Table 1 . • First it parses L j as y j(1) , y j(2) , . . . y j(|Lj |) and and scans the K-List to find the entry (a l , y l , r l ) such that y l = y j(|Lj |) .
• If |L j | > 1 then B constructs the sequence L j = y j(1) , y j(2) , . . . y j(|Lj |−1) and simulates a Hash query to itself on the value (m j , L j ).
• Let (m j , L j , b j , u j , h j , γ j ) be the entry in the H-List corresponding to (m j , L j ) whenever |L j | > 1.
Algorithm B uses Table 2 to compute its response. It adds (m j , h j , b j , u j , h j , γ j ) to the H-List and returns h j as its response to the hash query. 
). If such an entry does not exist, B adds it by simulating a hash query on the message-sequence (m s(i) , L s(i) ).
by making a sign query to C and returns σ s(i) as its response to the chain sign query. Note that
If b j = 0, algorithm B sets σ s(i) ← γ j and returns σ s (i) as its response to the chain sign query.
In either case it can be verified that σ s(i) is a valid chain signature on (m s(i) , L s(i) ). B also keeps track of all such queried messages. 
We know that b
If u k > 1, B reports Failure and terminates.
We know that
In other words, σ A /γ A is a valid BLS signature under public key y on the message (m k , L k ). Additionally, u k = 1 implies that B did not make a BLS sign query to C on the message (m k , L k ).
5
Algorithm B returns (σ A /γ A , (m k , L k )) to C, thereby winning Game 2.
Probability: We need the probability that B wins Game 2. Consider the events:
B succeeds if both these events happen.
The following three claims give the bound on .
Proof. Since the simulation provided by B is indistinguishable from a real game, the probability of A winning the simulated Game 1-a is the same as the probability of A winning Game 1-a. Thus,
Proof. Let q s > 1. Using Equation 1, define events:
For any key y l ∈ Y , define a l to be the first element of the entry (a l , r l , y l ) in the K-List corresponding to 
which has not been extracted.
By checking Table 2 , we can verify that
For event E 3 , we require that of the unextracted keys in L A , an odd number of keys y l have a l = 1.
To get the probability of E 4 , assume for simplicity that all keys except the ones restricted by the winning condition have been extracted. Consider the following three cases:
• Case 1: A did not make any non-trivial chain sign queries. In this case u k = 1 (necessarily), and Pr[E 4 |E 3 ∧ E 1 ] = 1.
• Case 2: A made some sign queries i such that
is unextracted. Then with probability 1 − 1/q s , we would have a l = 1, in which case u k = 1, and so we have Pr[
• Case 3: The only case left to consider is when one or more chain sign queries i have been made such that
Let us denote this set of queries by Q. This implies that for each such query i ∈ Q, there is at least one key in
) that has not been extracted. Now consider the set of queries Q * ⊆ Q defined as
Then for each i ∈ Q * , there is (necessarily) at least one key in L s(i) \L k that has not been extracted. Event E 4 implies that for each of these |Q * | unextracted keys y * l , the corresponding bits a * l in the K-List are 1. From the simulation, it is clear that the values of the above bits a * l are independent of A's view and so Pr[a * l = 1] = 1 − 1/q s independent of the other bits. Since there can be a maximum of q s queries of this type, therefore,
Combining Claims 1 and 2, we get the bound on .
Hash queries to C: For each entry in the H-List, B makes at most one hash query to C. Also, A can make up to q h hash queries on arbitrary message-sequence pairs (m * , L * ), and each sequence L * may contain up to n keys (and therefore, up to n sub-sequences). Consequently, each hash query by A can cause at most n entries to be added to the H-List. Additionally, adversary A may make sign queries on q s distinct message-sequence pairs (m * , L * ) without making any hash queries on them. These sign queries may cause up to nq s more entries to be added to the H-List. Thus, for a total of q h hash queries and q s sign queries, the number of entries in the H-List (and the number of hash queries made by algorithm B to challenger C) is upper-bounded by n(q h + q s ).
Sign queries to C: For each chain chain sign query by adversary A, algorithm B makes at most one sign query to challenger C. Therefore, q s ≤ q s .
Running time of B: It only remains to bound the running time t of B. This is the running time of A, plus the time required to generate up to n public keys; the time required to add up to n(q h + q s ) entries in the H-List. Each signature query involves up to one multiplication in G 1 . Assuming that the lists are efficiently indexed, the time for searching the H-List and K-List can be ignored. Adding each entry in the H-List and generating a public key requires 1 exponentiation and up to 1 multiplication in G 1 . Therefore, for a maximum of n(q h + q s ) entries in the H-List, a maximum of n public keys, and a maximum of q s signature queries, we have t ≤ t + c G1 (n(q h + 1) + q s (n + 1)), where c G1 is the time for 1 exponentiation and 1 multiplication in G 1 .
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.4.
The above proof is similar to the proof of security of Verifiably Encrypted Signatures (VES) of [9] . In fact, the security of CS in the weak known key attack model is very similar to the security of VES against signature extraction and forgery.
Adaptive Security In the Chosen Key Model
We note that above construction of chain signatures is also secure in the sense of adaptive chosen key attacks, where the adversary includes randomly chosen public keys in the chain signature of the Output phase of Game 1, provided that at least one of the keys in the chain signature is authentic (and not extracted). However, the security definition becomes complicated. To see how the the above construction is also secure in the chosen key model, observe that any chain signature (σ * , (m * , L * )) is also an aggregate signature on some (distinct) messages under public keys y * ∈ L * . It is proved in [9, Theorem 3.2] , that the aggregate signature scheme is secure under adaptive chosen key and chosen message attacks, provided that all the messages in the signature of the Output phase of Game 1 are distinct. Clearly, for any output chain signature (σ A , (m A , L S )), it must necessarily hold that all the messages signed under the individual keys y l ∈ L A are distinct.
Chain Signatures On Distinct Messages
In our model, chain signatures are defined only in a situation when many users sign the same message. However, in many situations users may need to sign different messages and still enjoy the benefits of chain signatures. This is not a major problem and we describe two approaches to solve it. The first and obvious approach is to simply include the individual messages in the hash before the chain signature is computed. However, the security reduction becomes quite complicated in this case. We suggest an alternate and simpler approach that does not require any modification of the chain signature protocol. The idea is to use chain signatures (on a random message) to authenticate the path independently of the actual message(s) in question and then link the message from the chain signature to the actual message(s) using any standard signature scheme that provides non-repudiation. This is the approach we will follow in the example of Section 5.1.1.
Efficiency Of Chain Signatures
Since for typical security, the value q = |G 1 | will be roughly 171 bits, elements of G 1 can be represented in at most 22 bytes. Consequently, the keys and signatures will be at most 22 bytes. The benchmarks of [19] indicate that each pairing operation using these parameters takes ≈ 8.6ms and each elliptic curve point exponentiation takes ≈ 1.5 ms. These results were obtained on a desktop PC with an AMD Athlon 2100+ 1.8 GHz, 1 GB RAM and an IBM 7200 RPM, 40 GB, Ultra ATA/100 hard drive [19] . Using these values and neglecting the faster operations, we obtain the following performance estimates of the above protocol (assuming n users in the chain):
1. Signing: one exponentiation in G 1 , one multiplication in G 1 , and one computation of H (total < 2ms).
2. Verification: n pairing computations and multiplications in G 2 , and n computations of H (giving < 1 second for n = 100).
Applications of Chain Signatures
Considering that chain signature enable us to correctly validate the path of any received message using very short signatures and provides non-repudiation, we can consider several applications: mobile agent authentication [20, 5] , group e-commerce, work-flow enforcement, secure routing, authenticated mail relaying, Grid computing and Mobile IP. Here, we discuss one such application: stateless routing.
Stateless Routing
The most common and robust interior and exterior routing protocol is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [21, 22] . It is a Path Vector Routing protocol, in which routers repeatedly advertise 'better' routes (along with the path details) to their immediate neighbors. On receiving an update, a router checks its routing table to decide if this advertised route is better than its existing routes. If so, the router updates its table and advertises the new route to all its other immediate neighbors. Although BGP is very robust, it has many security vulnerabilities [23, 24] . For instance, a rogue router could send forged updates or extract intermediate routes from legitimate updates and claim to a shorter route (we call the latter a Path Extraction Attack ). This is best explained using an example. Consider the network of routers given in Figure 2 . The numbers on the links indicate the metric. Assume that E is a rogue router who would like to intercept traffic sent from D to A, which would ordinarily be routed directly via router C.
In BGP, assume that (ordinary) signatures are used to authenticate updates. Then the following update messages will be sent. 
In this setup, traffic originating from D and destined for A will never pass through E. However, if E wants, it can simply extract the last two signatures in the update received from C and claim (to D) that it has a direct route to A by sending it the update {Sign A (A), Sign E (A E)}. In this case, D will assume that E has a more efficient path to A and use it to forward that traffic. Secure BGP (S-BGP) [3] mitigates this attack by requiring that "links" in the updates be two-way (i.e. contain signatures from each endpoint authenticating the other). In S-BGP, the routing updates would be as follows:
Although the protocol of Example 2 is secure from the path extraction attack, it has two drawbacks: (1) Each router must be "aware" of its neighbors, and (2) In the example, router C can no longer broadcast the same message to its neighbors. This can cause scalability problems as follows. Firstly, each router must establish authenticity of each of its peer(s). Secondly, each update is peer-specific and therefore, even a single path change could result in a large number of messages sent by a host with many neighbors. It would be much simpler if the underlying routing protocol resisted path extraction attacks and required each router to broadcast only one short message on each update without being aware of its neighbors (as in Example 1). We call such a protocol a Stateless Routing Protocol. Such stateless-ness is useful if path vector routing is used over broadcast networks (such as ad-hoc wireless/sensor networks).
Current research on S-BGP authentication assumes the above stateful scenario of Example 2 and is focused on methods to reduce the number of signatures transmitted and/or processing time for signing and verification [6, 9, 25] . For instance, aggregate signatures have been proposed to keep the signature payload to a constant size [9] . The authors of [3] propose the use of Signature Amortization [25] coupled with aggregate or sequential aggregate signatures [12] to reduce the size of update messages and the signing time. However, all the above works assume some sort of stateful environment, where information about peers is pre-distributed or known. In this work, we focus on how to achieve security under path extraction attacks in a stateless implementation of BGP. Our proposed protocol, called Stateless Secure-BGP (SS-BGP) is based on chain signatures and provides the following benefits.
1. It is fully stateless. Routers need not be aware of their neighbors.
2. The update size is constant irrespective of the number of peers. Additionally, only one message needs to be transmitted if using broadcast.
3. The signing time is constant. The verification time is linear to the size of the path and is comparable to efficient stateful S-BGP based on aggregate signatures [3] .
Stateless S-BGP (SS-BGP)
In this implementation, we will assume the same routing logic of BGP. However, we will use Example 1 in our scenarios and assume that routers may not be aware of their immediate neighbors. We will assume that routers can be directly identified using their public keys.
2. Storage: To be able to validate the signatures, each host must be able to store/obtain public keys of all routers in question, which may lead to scalability problems. This problem is easily solved using Identity Based Chain Signatures (IBCS) (briefly discussed in the conclusion) and Identity Based Signatures (IBS) where the IP address of a host acts as the public key. The security model of IBCS would be identical to the model described here.
3. Overhead : The overhead incurred by (M, M i , Sig i ) in update U i cannot be avoided. The chain signature additionally incurs the overhead of (σ i , L i ). Assuming that public keys can be uniquely identified by IP addresses, the sequences L i can be constructed from the IP addresses of the nodes in the path. Consequently, L i is part of the update message itself and does not incur any overhead. The only overhead is then the size of a chain signature, which will be less than 22 bytes using the parameters of [9] .
Multiple Updates Aggregation:
In the above description, we assumed that each advertisement U i contains only one route and is transmitted instantaneously. In the real world, each advertisement contains multiple routes and is sent periodically. Fortunately, both the chain signature and individual signature schemes used above allow for signature aggregation and aggregate verification where a large number of (chained or individual) signatures can be verified at once [9] . 6 
Summary
In this paper, we introduced the notion of Chain Signatures as an extension of Boneh et al.'s short signatures [15] . Although chain signature arise naturally from the aggregate signatures of [9] due to the inherent properties of bilinear maps, the security requirements of chain signatures is significantly different as demonstrated in Sections 3.2 and 3.4. We note that chain signatures without using bilinear maps were independently proposed in [5, 4] in which the authors used hypothetical primitives called Strong Associative One-Way Functions (SAOWFs). The protocol presented here uses a standard certificate-based PKI. However, it is possible to construct Identity Based Chained Signatures (IBCS) because of the observation that the Identity Based Signature (IBS) schemes of [26, 27] support signature aggregation with the property that once aggregated, individual signatures cannot be extracted.
Considering that chained signatures enable us to correctly validate the path of any received message and provide non-repudiation, we can consider several applications: mobile agent authentication [4, 5] , electronic auctions, relaying, token based authentication. As a practical demonstration of applications, we presented a novel method for stateless routing.
The main feature of chain signatures that distinguishes them from other multi-user signature schemes is that chain signatures provide delete-protection (See Section 2.1). The chain signature scheme presented here, however, does not provide strong delete-protection. Signatures that also provide strong delete protection are called Strong Chain Signatures (SCS). However, whether practical SCS schemes exist or not, is still an open question at this stage.
